Tim Miller and Jane Coaston Dissect Charlie Kirk's Thought Crime Podcast and the Pipeline Radicalizing Young Conservatives

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Tim Miller and Jane Coaston Dissect Charlie Kirk's Thought Crime Podcast and the Pipeline Radicalizing Young Conservatives

Tim Miller sits down with Jane Coaston, USC fellow and New York Times contributor, to examine the disturbing evolution of Charlie Kirk's content and its influence on young conservatives. From Thought Crime podcast clips advocating public executions for children to watch, to questioning Taylor Swift's fertility, Miller and Coaston explore how audience capture and intentional radicalization are reshaping the conservative movement. The conversation extends to the dysfunction of the House GOP, Alabama's IVF ruling, and the collapse of principled libertarianism into oppositional defiance disorder. Coaston offers sharp insights on why the culture war populism promoted by figures like Kirk and Tucker Carlson remains disconnected from actual American concerns, yet continues to capture the most engaged conservative audiences.

Categories: Liberal Opinions
February 20, 2024

The Charlie Kirk Pipeline: How Thought Crime Is Radicalizing Young Conservatives

Tim Miller welcomes Jane Coaston, fellow at the University of Southern California and contributing opinion writer to the New York Times, for a wide-ranging conversation about the current state of conservative media, politics, and ideology. The discussion centers on disturbing clips from Charlie Kirk's weekly podcast Thought Crime, where Kirk and other young conservative men share increasingly extreme views on everything from public executions to Taylor Swift's reproductive capacity.

Coaston describes Kirk's content as "a fascinating example of audience capture," explaining how content creators become prisoners of their most extreme followers. She recalls how Kirk's Turning Point USA was confronted by white nationalist groypers a few years ago, and rather than reject them, Kirk gradually shifted his content to accommodate their demands. "Once you have an audience, they don't have you—they have you," Coaston explains, referencing the phenomenon where audiences drive creators deeper into whatever content they produce.

Miller pushes back slightly on the audience capture theory, arguing that there's also top-down audience molding happening. Based on years of attending TPUSA events, he's noticed the questions and concerns of young attendees getting "weirder every year." While this represents a subset of a subset, Miller warns these are the people who will become congressional staffers, state legislators, and potentially Trump administration officials if the former president wins again.

The Myth of Mainstream Conservative Media

The conversation turns to an interview Miller conducted with Charles C.W. Cooke of National Review, where Cooke positioned himself as mainstream and Kirk as fringe. Miller challenges this framing: "The Egghead Republican conservatives are an even tinier group and they're shrinking." He points out that while National Review-style conservatives may find Kirk's content off-putting, there's an undeniable appeal to younger conservatives who want to feel like rebels and contrarians.

Coaston agrees, noting that the new generation of conservatives at TPUSA "figured out oh wait no one cares nobody cares about the three-legged stool and tax policy and limited government and liberty." What sells is culture war content, celebrity gossip, and grievance politics. Traditional conservative intellectual frameworks have been replaced by a form of politics that treats everything as an unsolvable culture war issue perfect for fundraising and media engagement.

House GOP Dysfunction and the Trump Effect

The discussion shifts to Miller's interview with Representative Don Bacon, who described the House Republican conference as containing National Security conservatives, social conservatives, moderate conservatives, and "populists." Miller finds this framing backwards: "The house conference is entirely run by the populists that he was trying to act like were kind of a fringe group."

Coaston observes that House Republicans are in a position where "everyone hates them and yet they have no reason to stop doing the thing that everybody hates." The business of the House has been replaced by generating media content and creating personalities. She argues that culture war is perfect for politicians because "culture wars don't have an end"—there's no policy prescription to fix America's relationship with God, making it an evergreen issue for fundraising and engagement.

Representatives like Dan Crenshaw who want to accomplish legislative goals find themselves trapped. They can't identify Donald Trump and his loyalists as the actual cause of congressional dysfunction without being cast out, so they end up in "permanent angst and frustration," unable to explain why they can't achieve anything. As Coaston notes, Republicans who want to complete tasks keep discovering "this isn't a task completing place, this is a task ignoring place."

The Problem with Tucker Carlson-Style Populism

When discussing Ukraine aid, Miller points to Crenshaw's description of Tucker Carlson as "not even a Republican" but rather a "populist demagogue"—while ignoring that Carlson is on Trump's VP shortlist and Crenshaw is not. This disconnect reveals how mainstream conservative figures refuse to acknowledge what their party has actually become.

Coaston questions whether this even qualifies as populism: "When I think about populism like in the history of American populism, there's like the populist movement of the early 20th century and talking about William Jennings Bryan and farmers." The current version "seems so untethered to the populace that I live around." She points out that ordinary people in line at the grocery store aren't concerned about The Little Mermaid being Black or a background lesbian kiss in a Buzz Lightyear movie.

This "invented populism" creates a movement that claims to represent the working class while Trump sells $9,000 autographed sneakers to Russian luxury watch dealers. The disconnect between populist rhetoric and actual policy becomes obvious when writers talk about expanding the social safety net or supporting unions, while actual Republican politicians "are like actually I don't want to do any of those things at all."

Alabama's IVF Ruling and the Post-Dobbs Reality

The conversation turns serious when discussing Alabama's Supreme Court ruling that frozen embryos are people and someone can be held liable for destroying them—a decision that imperils IVF treatment for hundreds of thousands of patients.

Coaston recalls the immediate aftermath of the Dobbs decision leak, when conservative voices tried to downplay the implications. She remembers Kevin Williamson saying abortion laws would just become like France, and Erick Erickson claiming people wouldn't notice changes. "This is the biggest dog catching the car moment in I think American political history," Coaston says, "because it was never just about abortion. It was always going to be about birth control, it was always going to be about IVF."

Having grown up Catholic and spent time in evangelical circles, Coaston is familiar with "snowflake children"—embryos that people adopt and have implanted because "every single embryo is a human life." This belief system has long viewed IVF as problematic because the process requires that some embryos won't be implanted. "For lots and lots of people who have had it, it is a very emotionally challenging time," she explains, noting that many people opposed to abortion rights also use IVF and birth control.

The Alabama ruling reveals what Coaston has long understood: "It's not it's also a decision about IVF, it's also about birth control, it's basically about anything having to do with people having sex with other people in a way that might result in the development of more people."

The Libertarian Party's Collapse Into Purity Spirals

Miller raises a quote from Penn Jillette about abandoning the libertarian label after receiving an email during lockdown inviting him to lead an anti-mask demonstration in Vegas. Jillette's response: "The fact that they sent me this email is something I need to be very ashamed of and I need to change."

Coaston, who left the Libertarian Party around the same time Miller left the Republican Party, explains her journey. She still embraces "small-l libertarianism"—a civic libertarianism that recognizes state power is often wielded against the least powerful. Her work on restrictions to African-Americans regarding gun rights reinforced this perspective.

But the Libertarian Party itself has become problematic for three reasons. First, it's been taken over by the Mises Caucus, which "views popularity as a sign that they are doing something wrong." Second, there's been a purity spiral where Gary Johnson, who got more votes than any libertarian candidate in history, was viewed as a "giant squish" for suggesting driver's licenses might be reasonable. Third, at a moment when more people could have embraced civic libertarianism—after George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, and Uvalde—the party "decided to double down on things like basically that Putin and Biden are the same person or that we should repeal every civil rights law."

Coaston describes the fundamental tension: "This was a battle between like we could make civic life better for more people or we could argue that it's okay to sell your own children and that actually we should let cops kill more people." The party chose to become "the party of oppositional defiance disorder," and as Coaston notes, "we already have one of those, we don't need another one that's somehow weirder and worse."

Can Ideas Survive Their Practitioners?

Miller poses a final question about whether libertarianism's practical failures suggest something fundamentally flawed about the ideology itself. If every attempt to put it into practice "gets warped into this gross racist oppositional defiance disorder," does that invalidate the core ideas?

Coaston's answer: "Both." She argues libertarianism can influence policy positively—she praises Salt Lake City's relaxed housing zoning that allows apartments next to single-family homes without society collapsing. Libertarian skepticism of "someone should do something" legislation, especially bills with names like "rescue baby bunnies or keep our children safe from evil," remains valuable.

But wielding libertarianism as an all-encompassing ideology is "really a bad idea." You end up in "true libertarianism has never been tried" territory. Libertarianism works best as "a helpful corrective" to state overreach, not as a complete governing philosophy. "There should probably be fewer laws and how those laws are enforced should perhaps be more even and equal," she concludes, "but that's not libertarianism, that's like libertarian—those are two different things to me."

The conversation ends with Coaston's advice: "If a political party really appeals to you, you should probably not join it." Like religious groups that show too much interest in recruiting you, political parties that seem perfectly aligned with your views are probably best avoided. In an age of audience capture, purity spirals, and radicalization pipelines, perhaps the most libertarian position is refusing to be a joiner at all.

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